Systematic Theology and Apologetics at Westminster

John M. Frame

Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy

Reformed Theological Seminary

Orlando, Florida

            Systematic theology and apologetics are closely related disciplines, for systematics formulates the biblical truth that the apologist defends. I have defined theology as "the application of the Bible by persons to all areas of human life,"[1] Among the various theological disciplines, systematic theology "seeks to apply Scripture as a whole."[2] Apologetics, then, is "the application of Scripture to unbelief,"[3] which makes it a subdivision of systematic theology.[4] In this paper, I shall reflect on the relation of systematics to apologetics in the history of Westminster Theological Seminary.

Van Til, the Systematic Theologian

            Apologetics has probably never been related as closely to systematic theology as it was in the writings of Cornelius Van Til. Van Til (1895-1987) began teaching at Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia at the seminary's beginning in 1929. He retired from full-time teaching in 1972, but taught some courses until around 1979.

Defending Christianity as a Unit

Van Til's interest in systematic theology is reflected in his frequent emphasis that Christian theism should be defended "as a unit."[5] That is, in his view we must not defend a general theism first and then later defend Christianity. Rather, the apologist must defend only the distinctive theism of Christianity. As Van Til often put it, we should not try to prove that God exists without considering what kind of God we are proving. And that means, in turn, that we should not try to prove that God exists without defining God in terms of all the doctrines of Scripture.

Does this principle imply that we must prove all the doctrines of Christianity in every apologetic argument we employ? Critics are sometimes tempted to understand Van Til this way, and Van Til's own expressions sometimes encouraged that misunderstanding.[6] But Van Til was too thoughtful to teach anything so absurd. Rather, I think what he meant was that (1) the apologist must "presuppose" the full revelation of the Bible in defending the faith.[7] (2) He must not tone down any biblical distinctives in order to make the faith credible. (3) His goal should be to defend (by one argument or many) the whole of biblical theism, including the authority of Scripture, Trinity, predestination, incarnation, blood atonement, resurrection, and consummation. And (4) the apologist should seek to show that compromise in any of these doctrines leads to incoherence in all human knowledge.

Van Til's Writings

We can also see from his writings how important systematic theology was to Van Til. He begins his Apologetics with a 22-page summary of systematic theology.[8] There he presents God's nature and attributes, his knowledge and will, his triunity, and the implications of these for Christian metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Then he discusses anthropology, Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Chapter 2 of the book discusses revelation and Scripture. Only in Chapter 3 (of five chapters), after this systematic theological material, does he enter into the discussion of apologetics as such. So in Van Til's basic apologetics text, 37 out of 99 pages are formulations of systematic theology.

Van Til taught systematic theology, as well as apologetics, at Westminster Seminary through much of his career.[9] He taught the required courses in the doctrine of revelation, the doctrine of God, and ethics. His class "syllabi" for these courses, actually privately published books, An Introduction to Systematic Theology[10] and Christian-Theistic Ethics,[11] are still available. His other writings also comment on many theological issues. In my judgment, he made important contributions to theological method (the concept of a theological system, analogy, paradox, the role of Scripture), the Trinity, divine sovereignty, election and reprobation, revelation, and common grace.[12] He also wrote voluminously on modern theologians: Barth, Brunner, Whitehead, the "new hermeneutic" group, and many more.[13] Clearly much of his apologetic work had theological targets.

Van Til and Murray

Van Til greatly respected John Murray, who taught systematics at Westminster from 1930 to 1966, and considered him a close friend. The two men went on walks together. In "The First Forty Years: A Tribute to my Colleagues," he says, "As for John Murray, who of us did not suffer healing through his seemingly impeccable holiness of conversation?"[14] He quoted Murray a number of times in his writings, always with approval.[15]

This was an interesting relationship, especially considering the fact that the two men were very different in their approaches to theological issues: Murray was the detailed exegete, Van Til the philosopher who discussed biblical doctrines in the big picture of the Christian theistic worldview. But so far as I can tell, there was little if any tension between the two men.

There was one occasion on which Murray found fault with one of Van Til's formulations. Van Til used to say that just as there is an "old man" in the believer representing the old, sinful nature, so there is an "old man" in the unbeliever representing the revelation of God that the unbeliever had tried to suppress. Van Til urged students in their apologetic encounters to appeal to the "old man" in the unbeliever, not the "new man" that suppressed the truth. Murray disagreed, however, with Van Til's understanding of the "old man" in Romans 6,[16] and he thought that the phrase "old man" was inappropriate to refer to the unbeliever's suppressed knowledge of God. In one class I had with him, Van Til began to talk about the unbeliever's old man, then retracted it, saying something like "John Murray doesn't like that way of putting it, and I guess I don't either."

Van Til, Berkouwer, and the Primacy of Exegesis

G. C. Berkouwer, author of many volumes of dogmatics, devoted some criticism to Van Til, both in The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth[17] and in his article "The Authority of Scripture (A Responsible Confession)" in the 1971 Van Til Festschrift.[18] In the latter piece, Berkouwer complains against Van Til's lack of biblical exegesis in his polemics against other theologians, including Berkouwer. In reply, Van Til says,

I agree that my little book on The Sovereignty of Grace should have had much more exegesis in it than it has. This is a defect. The lack of detailed scriptural exegesis is a lack in all my writings. I have no excuse for this.[19]

But Van Til then adds that he is familiar with the commentary literature and particularly with John Murray's commentary on Romans. In the point of dispute, the doctrine of election in Romans 9, Van Til says that he agrees with Murray, over against Ridderbos and Berkouwer.

            It is significant that Van Til acknowledged that his lack of exegesis is a defect in his writings. Clearly he agreed with Murray that exegesis is the foundation of systematic theology, and indeed of apologetics as well. No apologist has given as much attention as Van Til to the biblical foundations of his apologetic and theological method.  Nevertheless, although Van Til did not seek to justify his lack of exegesis, he made that fault understandable: He felt a freedom to focus on philosophical issues, because of his confidence in Murray and in other Reformed exegetes.

            At Westminster, Van Til trusted his colleagues. When he was criticized for failure to emphasize historical evidences for the Bible's reliability, he pointed to the work of his colleagues in the "other departments of the seminary," saying that they "are doing it better than I could do it."[20] There was a unity of conviction on the early faculty of Westminster that gave to each professor the freedom to specialize.

            Although I agree emphatically with both Van Til and Murray as to the primacy of exegesis in theology, I think Van Til was too hard on himself in his response to Berkouwer. The Spirit of God has given many different gifts to members of his body, and ideally each of us should have the liberty to do what he does best. God called Van Til to do systematic theology and apologetics from a broad, philosophical, worldview perspective, and it was good that he focused on that. It was also good that he recognized the primacy of exegesis and was willing to learn from those who were gifted differently from himself. If Van Til had tried to re-do the work of Stonehouse and Murray, most likely he would have wasted his time and God's.

John Murray, the Apologist

A Seminary of Apologists

            John Murray was less of an apologist than Van Til was a systematic theologian. But he was an apologist, at least in the sense that the whole early faculty of Westminster were apologists. Westminster was born in the struggle with theological liberalism, and liberalism, because of its denial of many fundamental Christian doctrines, was a legitimate target of apologetics. We have seen how Van Til wrote often about the forms of liberalism that were prominent in his own time.

J. Gresham Machen, later the founder of Westminster, had been appointed to the chair of apologetics at Princeton Seminary in 1928, though his teaching up to that point was in the area of New Testament. The seminary board, however, refused to ratify the appointment. Machen was known for his sharp and cogent arguments against liberalism, and the board sought to reorganize the seminary to make room for liberal professors. Machen therefore resigned his post at Princeton, and with Robert Dick Wilson, Oswald Allis, and some younger men (including Van Til and Murray) he started Westminster Seminary in Philadelphia.

            Though Machen was not a philosopher, his writings were apologetic works in an important way. His Christianity and Liberalism, The Virgin Birth of Christ, and The Origin of Paul's Religion were apologetic in that they attacked forms of biblical scholarship that deny the supernatural worldview of Scripture, that is, forms of unbelief. At Westminster, Machen taught New Testament rather than apologetics as such, for he recognized that Van Til was much better qualified for the apologetics position. But Machen's teaching and writing, until his death in 1937, always maintained an apologetic edge. So Greg Bahnsen was able to speak of Machen and Van Til as two distinct, but compatible, strains in the "apologetical tradition of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church."[21]

            But that apologetic edge was characteristic of all the members of the original Westminster faculty. Robert Dick Wilson, Oswald Allis, Ned Stonehouse, and later Edward J. Young also made the attack on liberal biblical criticism a major part of their writing and teaching. Paul Woolley, Professor of Church History, devoted considerable time to the struggle for orthodoxy in the church, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. R. B. Kuiper, Professor of Practical Theology, taught students to preach particularly on areas of doctrine in which the orthodox faith is under attack.

Apologetics in Murray's Writings

            Of all the early faculty, John Murray was probably the least inclined toward apologetics. Yet he taught courses dealing with Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and other liberal theologians.[22] And in 1936 he published a series of articles in the Presbyterian Guardian on "The Reformed Faith and Modern Substitutes." The "substitutes" included "modern dispensationalism," and Murray's articles on that subject caused much controversy in the young Presbyterian Church of America, arguably contributing to the division of 1937. But liberalism was also on Murray's list of targets, as was Arminianism.[23]

            Murray did not often reflect on questions of apologetic method. The late Dr. John Gerstner, who graduated from Westminster around 1940, once asked me (when I was studying at Westminster in the early 1960s) whether I thought John Murray was a Van Tillian. Interestingly, Gerstner, certainly a very intelligent student in his Westminster days, with major interests in apologetics and systematic theology, was unable to tell. Gerstner remarked to me, "you know, those old Scots ate up natural theology with their oatmeal."

            There are two documents that give us something of an answer to that question, though Murray never gave the attention to this subject that Van Til did. One is a set of student notes from Murray's lectures on the Doctrine of God, or "Theology Proper." The other is a paragraph from his article, "The Attestation of Scripture."

Murray's Lectures on Theology Proper

Murray rarely taught the seminary course in the Doctrine of God. It was regularly Van Til's course until 1960 when younger men took it over. I assume, however, that Murray taught it once or twice when Van Til was on leave, prompting one student to take very detailed notes and make mimeographed copies of them for others.

            I can't remember how they came into my possession. I assume the lectures were given in the late 1940s or 1950s. These lectures are not as polished as the lectures in Murray's other courses. I presume that is the reason they were not included in the volumes of Murray's Collected Writings.[24] But they do reflect Murray's customary high quality of thought. I shall discuss the epistemological section of these lectures.

1. Murray on the Knowability of God

            In these student notes, the first 29 of 93 pages deal with the knowability and incomprehensibility of God, indicating that Murray, like Van Til, placed great emphasis on religious epistemology. He begins with the biblical teaching that all people know God (Rom. 1:21) (also a very strong emphasis in Van Til).[25] Then he explores "the character of this knowledge." He points out that Calvin's statement "we do not know God as he is in himself" can be taken in a proper or an improper sense. The proper sense is that "we are entirely dependent for our knowledge of God on the revelation which He has given to us."[26] The improper sense is "that we do not know God as he really and truly is."[27] The former proposition, Murray says, is biblical. The latter "leads to skepticism."[28]

2. Murray on Analogy

            On the question of analogy, Murray makes another distinction. Our knowledge of God is analogical, in the sense that our knowledge is "after the likeness of" God's own knowledge of himself. But what we know, the object of our knowledge, according to Murray, is not an analogy, but the truth.

Our knowledge of the truth is analogical, but what we know is not analogical; e.g., our knowledge of that Truth is analogical, but it is not an analogy of the truth that we know. What we know is the Truth.[29]

Murray says that if what we know, the object of our knowledge, is a mere analogy, then we do not know the truth at all.

            It would be interesting to know to what extent Murray's formulation here is influenced by the controversy during the 1940s between Van Til and Gordon H. Clark over the incomprehensibility of God. Murray shares Van Til's view that our knowledge of God is analogical. But Clark and his disciples had criticized Van Til, saying that such a position leads to skepticism. Van Til replied that to make our knowledge identical to God's, as the Clark party tried to do, is to violate the creator-creature distinction. Murray's formulation adds a valuable clarification of this debate: our method of knowing is different from God's, though "analogous" to it; but the object of our knowledge, what we know, is not an analogy, but the truth itself. Murray seeks to maintain the creator-creature distinction without falling into skepticism, thus addressing the concerns of both Clark and Van Til.

            I think that Murray's distinction goes a long way toward dissolving the controversy. The Clark party was willing to say that our way of knowing (they called it the "mode") is different from God's. But they wanted to insist that God and human beings could know the same propositions (such as "Jesus rose from the dead.") Van Til was willing to say that God and man know the same propositions. In his Introduction to Systematic Theology, he says, "That two times two are four is a well-known fact. God knows it. Man knows it."[30] But he wanted to insist that our way of knowing is different from God's. On these matters, the most heatedly debated of the controversy, Van Til and Clark actually agreed.[31] One imagines that if John Murray had urged his distinction on the parties during the debate, and if the parties had listened to him with a teachable spirit, much of the battle could have been avoided.[32]

            I should say too that in my judgment Murray's concept of analogy here is quite compatible with Van Til's. When Van Til said that our knowledge was "analogous" to God, he did not mean, as Thomas Aquinas meant, that we can speak of God only in figurative language. Rather, he meant, as Murray says, that our knowing images God's, that we think God's thoughts after him. So Van Til did not deny the point that Murray makes here, that "it is not an analogy of the truth that we know. What we know is the Truth." Van Til's interpreters, both friendly and unfriendly, have often misunderstood him on this matter.[33]

3. Murray on the Incomprehensibility of God

            Murray's lectures on Theology Proper continue by discussing directly the nature of the incomprehensibility of God.[34] He does not address the precise issue of the Clark controversy, namely whether there is any "point of identity" between a divine thought and a human thought. I presume that he would answer that question in line with his distinction noted above in connection with analogy: God and man can believe the same propositions, but the nature of their thought is always different.

            Murray's discussion of incomprehensibility is more in line with the traditional theological discussion. Van Til, in defining incomprehensibility as a lack of sameness between divine and human thoughts, was actually using the term in a rather novel sense. On the traditional understanding, followed by Murray, incomprehensibility simply refers to the limited character of our knowledge of God. So in his lectures, Murray makes various traditional distrinctions. On the distinction between incomprehensibility and inapprehensibility (unknowability), for example, he affirms the former, denies the latter. He also emphasizes helpfully that God is incomprehensible not only in those things that are unrevealed (Deut. 29:29), but also in the things that are revealed (Rom. 11:33-36).

4. Murray on Revelation

            Then Murray discusses "The Sources of our Knowledge of God."[35] As in Van Til's Introduction to Systematic Theology, Murray distinguishes between the revelation of God in "Man himself," in "the external world," and through "special revelation." Under "Man himself," he discusses Rom. 2:12-15 and Rom. 1:32 in some detail, but emphasizes also, as Van Til also does, that concretely this revelation always works together with revelation in the external world and with God's special revelation. 

            Under "Revelation given in the external world," Murray, like Van Til, focuses on Rom. 1:18-20. He reads katechon in Rom. 1:18 to mean "holding back" rather than "holding down," but he doesn't explain the significance of that distinction. Van Til usually translated the term "suppressing." It is not clear here whether Murray is supporting Van Til's interpretation or suggesting an alternative.

            Under "special revelation," he makes several points, not in this order: (1) Though it is chiefly redemptive in content, it is not exclusively so. Special revelation (divine speech to man) was given to Adam before the fall, for example. (2) Special revelation is necessary to remove our sinful blindness, and therefore to enable us to use the other forms of revelation rightly. (3) Special revelation is more direct, intimate, rich, and more diversified than general revelation. (4) Christian theology is not

…simply the super-structure of the theology derived from special revelation erected upon a foundation provided by unenlightened human reason as it deals with data of general revelation. There is a place for natural theology in Christian theology, but it is not the unaided, unenlightened human inquiry; natural theology properly conceived of is simply the knowledge of God derived from general revelation, as general or natural revelation is wrought upon by the enlightened human understanding, derived from special revelation.[36]

To answer Dr. Gerstner's question, this passage shows what kind of natural theology John Murray ate with his oatmeal. It is a natural theology that presupposes special revelation. Here Murray's formulation is just as Van Tillian as Van Til's own, though put into rather different language.

5. Murray on Theistic Proofs

            Then Murray goes on to discuss "Theistic Proofs,"[37] emphasizing as above that "we may never think of this argumentation as conducted in abstraction from the light derived from special revelation."[38] He begins with an important distinction between evidence and argument. The evidence is God's self-manifestation in the world. Argument is our formulation of the evidence. I don't believe that Van Til ever noted this distinction. He seemed to think, for example, that because the evidence of God's general revelation renders man inexcusable, we should always claim absolute certainty, not probability, for the conclusions of our arguments. Van Til did not consider that although the evidence (God's revelation) justifies an absolutely certain conclusion that God exists, our argumentative formulation of that evidence is fallible and sometimes only probable.[39] Murray's distinction here adds a necessary clarification to Van Til's formulation.

            Like Van Til, Murray says that theistic proofs, in their proper context of general and special revelation, are valid. Van Til is often supposed to have rejected theistic proofs, but in fact he endorsed them, as long as they are used in a way that presupposes the truth of special revelation.[40] Van Til proposed that they be reformulated in a way consistent with Christian epistemology. But his own proposals for reformulation are rare and sketchy. Hence, Murray's favorable descriptions of theistic arguments are of interest.

            The ontological argument traditionally argues from our idea of God as the greatest possible being to the actual existence of God. The argument says that if God does not exist, it would be possible to conceive of a being greater than he, one who does exist. So if God is the greatest possible being, he must exist. Murray describes this as an argument based on man's sensus divinitatis, God's witness in human consciousness. That divine witness brings about an idea in our minds of a being "than which no greater can exist" (the phrase of Anselm, author of the most influential formulation of the ontological argument). Murray agrees that Anselm's phrase is a true description of the biblical God, and he agrees with Anselm that "if we believe in God there is implicit in the conception [of God] the conception of His reality."[41]

Murray disagrees, however, with Anselm's "method." Anselm argues from an idea of God produced by God's revelation, rather than from the revelation itself. Murray considers this procedure inadequate. I confess I don't follow Murray's argument here. We cannot refer to God's revelation apart from our own ideas of that revelation. Nor can we argue from God's revelation, without arguing from our ideas of it. If it is wrong to argue from our ideas of God's revelation, then it is impossible for us to argue from the revelation itself, which Murray clearly wants to do. I believe that here Murray has forgotten the important distinction he made earlier between evidence and argument. God's revelation is the evidence. But the argument is always one step removed from the evidence, a formulation in human language, involving human ideas. So we should not hold it against Anselm that he argues from his idea of God.

Murray then discusses the "historical argument,"[42] which, I gather, is the argument that the nearly universal belief in God through centuries of history can be explained only by God's real existence. Murray sees this as an extension of the ontological argument. As the ontological argument reasons from one person's idea of God to God's reality, so the historical argument reasons from the ideas of God held by people universally to God's existence. Murray speaks favorably of this argument as one that draws implications from the universal sensus deitatis.

In the "moral argument," Murray says, there is recognition of the fact that without a personal creator, "the concept of responsible creaturehood is meaningless."[43] The teleological argument says that the universe displays "the imprint of God's wisdom," certainly a biblical theme.[44] And the cosmological argument turns on the point of Rom. 1:19-20, "that the phenomenal world finds its only adequate explanation in the fact of creation, and creation by the God whose eternal power and divinity is imprinted upon it."[45]

Murray's remarks on these arguments are very brief paragraphs, but they sum up (in my view better than Van Til ever did it) a strategy for formulating the traditional arguments in a Reformed and biblical way. His comments on the ontological argument require clarification, as we have seen, but on the whole his treatment is valuable. 

Murray's "The Attestation of Scripture"

            The second evidence of Murray's apologetic position that I would like to mention is his article "The Attestation of Scripture" in the Westminster Seminary symposium on Scripture, The Infallible Word.[46] In the original version of this article, Murray says,

We do not elicit the doctrine of Scripture from an inductive study of what we suppose determines its character. We derive our doctrine of Scripture from what the Scripture teaches with respect to its own character—in a word, from the testimony it bears to itself.

            This might seem to be arguing in a circle. It might seem analogous to the case of a judge who accepts the witness of the accused in his own defence rather than the evidence derived from all the relevant facts in the case. We should, however, be little disturbed by this type of criticism. It contains an inherent fallacy. It is fully admitted that normally it would be absurd and a miscarriage of justice for a judge to accept the testimony of the accused rather than the verdict required by all the relevant evidence. But the two cases are not analogous. There is one sphere where self-testimony must be accepted as absolute and final. This is the sphere of our relation to God. God alone is adequate witness to himself. And our discussion with respect to the character of Scripture belongs to this category. Our discussion is premised upon the proposition that the Bible is the Word of God and therefore premised upon the presupposition that it is unique and belongs to the realm of the divine. For this reason, the argument from self-testimony is in order and perfectly consistent. Indeed, it is the only procedure that is consistent with the uniqueness of the question with which we are dealing.[47]

This is the most explicitly Van Tillian passage in Murray's writings. Here he emphasizes the theme that Scripture is self-attesting and that discussions of the Bible must be based on the "presupposition" that it is God's Word, themes familiar to readers of Van Til. He even implies that such presupposing is a kind of circular argument. See my earlier footnote on the sense in which Van Til admits to circularity.

            However, I confess to having been surprised and a little disappointed that in the Third Revised Printing of the volume[48] the paragraph beginning "This might seem to be arguing in a circle" is missing. So in 1973 I wrote to Prof. Murray, who was then retired and living in Scotland, bringing greetings and asking him the reasons for the omission of that paragraph. I asked him if perhaps the omission was an accident. He replied on June 20, 1973, as follows:

            The omission you refer to was revision on my part. I am not sure that I can recollect all the considerations that prompted me years ago. However, this I can say. The argument of the context is not affected by the omission nor is the underlying apologetic. I think the main reason was that some people who would be quite amenable to the argument propounded would be likely to be repelled by the expression "arguing in a circle," not because they are unwilling to accede to the method exemplified, but because "arguing in a circle" as description is for them a bogey that arouses unfavorable reaction even though in reality the argument involved is not alien to their thinking.

Van Til, of course, was not as squeamish about the phrase "arguing in a circle." But we should take Murray at his word here that his revision to the article represents no change in his apologetic method, that the change is terminological rather than conceptual.

Murray and Van Til

            The evidence of Murray's writings, therefore, is that he and Van Til were united in their apologetic method. I could also mention Murray's article, "Common Grace,"[49] which provided exegetical support to a doctrine that Van Til also defended in controversy, and Murray's "The Free Offer of the Gospel,"[50] written in the heat of the Clark controversy, which supported Van Til's view of the gospel offer rather than Clark's.

            It is possible that Murray's apologetic position was not clearly formulated during Dr. Gerstner's student years. It is evident to me that the attacks on Westminster Seminary from various quarters, and particularly the Clark controversy, moved the professors at the seminary to greater unity and mutual support. Certainly during the Clark controversy the Westminster faculty was united behind Van Til.[51] I would assume that under such pressure they may have come to express themselves in more explicitly Van Tillian ways than they might have otherwise.

            The relation between Van Til and Murray established the pattern for later generations of Westminster apologists and systematic theologians. I can therefore be briefer on the later teachers. I do have more to say, especially about the Westminster apologists. I will say less about the members of the systematic theology departments, because I assume that other essays in this volume will deal with them in some detail.

Robert D. Knudsen

            Robert Knudsen (1924-2000) taught apologetics at Westminster from 1955-1995. On apologetic matters he followed Van Til's thought closely. In comparison with Van Til, he was not a prolific writer. His emphases can be discerned in his paper, "The Transcendental Perspective of Westminster's Apologetics."[52]

At Van Til's suggestion, Knudsen studied in some detail the school of philosophy founded in the Netherlands by Herman Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, known as "The Philosophy of the Idea of Law." From the mid-1930s through the 1950s, Van Til had been enthusiastic about this school of thought, for like Van Til they revered Abraham Kuyper, and their writings reflected a number of his own themes: the necessity of Christian philosophy, the idolatry of non-Christian thought, the need for philosophers to presuppose the biblical themes of creation, fall, and redemption. But by 1960, Van Til was beginning to lose confidence in these Dutch thinkers. They did not clearly affirm the inerrancy of Scripture, and they recommended a form of dialogue with secular philosophers that in Van Til's view did injustice to the antithesis between belief and unbelief.[53]

Knudsen agreed with Van Til that the Dooyeweerdian thinkers held inadequate views of Scripture, but he did not accept Van Til's criticisms of their dialogue-strategy, and in general he sought to promote the Dooyeweerdian approach at Westminster. There was tension between Van Til and Knudsen over this issue.

The Dooyeweerd group also raised questions about the methods and assumptions of traditional Reformed systematic theology, accusing it of "dualism" and dependence on Greek philosophy.[54] Knudsen to some extent agreed with these accusations, though he thought they were often overdrawn. For instance, I can remember him questioning the reference in the Westminster Confession of Faith 1.1 to the "light of nature," suggesting that the Confession at that point was making a concession to rationalism.

Knudsen continued Van Til's practice of criticizing modern theologians, focusing on post-Barthian developments: Tillich, Bultmann, the New Hermeneutic. He also dealt with modern philosophy, especially existentialism and Marxism. He knew the existentialists so well that when he expounded Heidegger, for instance, his exposition sounded like Heidegger himself speaking. Knudsen's mastery of the technical terms and style of modern thinkers, however, did not always serve the clarity of his own analysis and criticism.

He also applied his Dooyeweerdian/transcendental approach to the sciences, producing booklets on history, psychology, and sociology for his course The Encounter Between Christianity and Secular Science.

Though Knudsen did teach at least one systematics course in the mid-1950s when John Murray was on leave, he did not regularly teach required courses in the systematics department, as Van Til did. Although he had some objections to the categories and methods by which the traditional Reformed doctrines were formulated, he did not spend much time reflecting on how to reformulate them. He rather focused on the more narrowly apologetic task of refuting the opponents of these doctrines.

Harvie M. Conn

Harvie Conn (1933-1999) became a missionary to Korea after his studies at Westminster. In 1972 he returned to Westminster to teach. Van Til formally retired in that year, though he continued to teach courses at Westminster until 1979. Van Til's introductory apologetics course was passed on to Conn.  Conn added nothing new to Van Til's theory of apologetics, or to the formulations of Reformed systematics. But he showed the students how valuable Van Til's apologetics can be in the practical work of evangelism and missions. He gave the students practical projects, like multi-media presentations of the Gospel, dealing with apologetic issues. Conn was also a movie buff, and he showed the students how a Christian can use films in apologetic witness.

Conn did not disturb in any way the close relation between apologetics and systematics that we have been describing. It is interesting at this point to note the variety of gifts that can be brought to bear on the work of apologetics: biblical studies (Machen), philosophy (Van Til, Knudsen), systematic theology (Murray), evangelism, missions, and knowledge of culture (Conn). Apologetics brings together all the theological disciplines as it seeks to prove Christianity "as a unit."

In 1975, Conn asked to be relieved of the apologetics course to focus more on missions, in which he made many distinguished contributions. His successor in the course is described in the next section.

Autobiographical Interlude

With some reluctance I now inject myself into the narrative, for I am part of the story, for better or worse, and very much a bridge between apologetics and systematics at Westminster. I earned the B. D. degree at Westminster from 1961-64, after undergraduate work at Princeton University and before graduate work at Yale University. I majored in philosophy at Princeton, emphasized apologetics at Westminster by taking electives from Van Til, and studied philosophical theology at Yale. So I figured that if I were ever invited to teach at Westminster, that invitation would come from the apologetics department. That did not happen, for two reasons: (1) in the late 1960s, there was no opening in the apologetics department; Van Til and Knudsen were able to handle all the course offerings in that field. (2) Although I considered myself a Van Tillian, Van Til himself had some doubts. We had some problems communicating: his philosophical language was from the idealist tradition, mine from Anglo-American language analysis. He was steeped in the Dutch theological and philosophical literature; I was not. I also had some disagreements with Van Til-- on details, as I saw it, rather than matters of major emphasis. Van Til preferred to work with people who did not disagree with him, even on details.

So I did not expect to be asked to return to teach at Westminster. But, to my surprise, I received in 1967 a communication from Norman Shepherd about teaching in the Westminster systematics department. Murray had retired in 1966 and returned to Scotland, leaving young Shepherd (five years older than I) with the full responsibility for the systematics curriculum. So I became a systematic theologian, teaching the courses Van Til had taught for many years: Doctrine of the Word, Doctrine of God, and Ethics. Van Til did welcome me to the faculty and asked me also to teach Th. M. electives in the apologetics department. There I taught courses in contemporary analytic philosophy, an area that had not been covered by Van Til or Knudsen.

I was committed to Van Til's apologetic method and to Murray's exegetical emphasis. I sought to integrate these even more intimately than Van Til and Murray had done: integrating detailed exegesis with worldview consciousness. In Ethics, Van Til's distinction between goal, motive, and standard provided a course structure. In the Doctrine of the Word, I took special note of Van Til's emphasis on the interrelation of different forms of revelation: revelation from God, from the world, and from the self.

In the Doctrine of God, I first structured the course using the traditional distinction between God's transcendence and immanence. But eventually I saw that "transcendence" is somewhat ambiguous. The term can evoke the idea that God is so far away from us that we cannot know him or speak truly of him. That idea, characteristic of neoplatonism, mysticism, and much modern liberal theology, is not biblical. If we are to use the word transcendence, I thought, we should use it to represent the biblical language of God's exaltation: the exaltation of royal dignity rather than distance from us. But even that concept of transcendence has some ambiguity. As king, God is exalted both in the control he exercises over creation and in his authority to command rational creatures. So I structured the Doctrine of God course in terms of God's control, authority (these constituting his transcendence), and presence (=his immanence).

Three courses, three threefold distinctions: In Ethics, goal, standard, and motive. In Doctrine of the Word, revelation from nature, God, and the self. In Doctrine of God, control, authority, and presence. These three triads came together in my mind: (1) Goal seemed to fit together with nature and control; (2) standard with God and authority, (3) motive with self and presence. 

Here is the rationale for these lineups: (1) The goal of ethics is the Kingdom of God, his glory. This goal is realized through the processes of nature and history under God's control. (2) Our ethical acts should also be subject to God's standard, "revelation from God," the revelation of God's authority. (3) And the inner motive enabling us to act ethically comes from the Spirit, God's presence, conforming us to his image, the revelation of God through the self.

So we can look at ethics and other theological disciplines "situationally" (focusing on the nature of the created world), "normatively" (focusing on the authority of God's revelation) or "existentially" (focusing on God's presence with his people). I defined these as three "perspectives" on theology, for they are interdependent. One cannot understand the situation without the light of Scripture and our personal involvement. One cannot understand Scripture without understanding its history, and without being able to apply it to the world and the self. And one cannot understand himself without understanding Scripture and the world, his environment.[55] The theologian can begin at any of these three points, but in seeking to understand one of them, he will be forced to gain an understanding of the other two.

Such is my "multi-perspectivalism."[56] It is a kind of broad philosophical view of things, the traditional philosophical distinction between God, the world, and the self; but I believe it is exegetically based. Even apart from these triads, however, it seemed to me important (and still does) that we recognize the importance of thinking from different perspectives. We are finite beings, so we cannot see everything at once. To know something, we must seek to look at it from different angles and to benefit from the perspectives of others.

It is thus that I have tried to enrich my teaching of Reformed theology with insights developed out of Van Til's philosophical apologetic.

I taught mostly systematics courses until 1975, when Harvie Conn vacated the introductory apologetics course. I was asked to teach it then, with Van Til's blessing. I combined that course with the first semester systematics course, The Doctrine of the Word of God. In that combined course I developed a unit on epistemology, a subject of importance to both apologetics and systematics. Unlike most epistemologists I sought to develop my theory of knowledge from Scripture, using both Van Tillian insights and direct exegetical analysis. My Doctrine of the Knowledge of God was published in 1987, and I think it reflects a very close integration of theology and philosophy: traditional philosophical questions answered by biblical exegesis.

As I evaluate my own contributions, my chief strength in the area of apologetics has been my integration of the discipline with Reformed systematics, in the tri-perspectival framework described earlier.[57] My chief weakness has been in the formulation of specific arguments and evidences in defense of the faith. So, despite the focus on philosophy in my early studies, I have turned out to be more of a systematic theologian than a philosopher, more a theologian than an apologist in the traditional sense. But in my work it is very hard to draw a line between the two disciplines. When I am writing theological books and articles, I am always seeking to present a rational basis for my conclusions; and my desire is that those rational arguments are based on biblical warrants.

In 1980, I left Westminster in Philadelphia to become one of the founding faculty of Westminster in California. I taught there for twenty years, in both apologetics and systematics. In 2000, I left Westminster to accept a position at Reformed Theological Seminary, Orlando Florida, where I continue to teach in these same areas. I may be permitted to comment that RTS continues the close integration of apologetics and systematics characteristic of Westminster. The predominant apologetic position at RTS is presuppositional, the emphasis of its systematic theology department exegetical. Nine former students of mine teach on the faculty of RTS, and others have been very sympathetic to the kind of integration I have proposed. In this way as in others, Westminster has had an influence beyond its own campuses.

Vern S. Poythress

It might seem strange to refer to the work of a New Testament scholar in a paper on the relationship of systematics to apologetics. But Poythress, who joined the Westminster faculty in the late 1970s, is as much of a systematician as he is a biblical scholar, and he has been deeply interested in apologetics as well. His Philosophy, Science, and the Sovereignty of God[58] is a brilliant integration between Van Til's apologetics, Reformed systematics, my multi-perspectivalism, and the linguistic system of Kenneth Pike, with whom Poythress studied. Poythress applied this approach to theological method in Symphonic Theology: the Validity of Multiple Perspectives in Theology,[59] and to hermeneutics in God-Centered Biblical Interpretation.[60] Besides his teaching in New Testament, he has taught systematics courses on the Doctrine of God and the Doctrine of Man. Although Poythress is a former student of mine, I am sure that I have learned more from him than he has from me. His work has profoundly reinforced the integration of systematics and apologetics at Westminster.

Recent Westminster Theologians

            I will say little about other members of Westminster's systematics departments, since other articles in this volume will cover their contributions. As I mentioned earlier, Norman Shepherd succeeded John Murray in 1966. He was very much like Murray in the clarity and preciseness of his thinking and in some of his theological emphases: for instance Murray and Shepherd both advocated the exclusive use of Psalm versions in public worship. Both Murray and Shepherd were strong supporters of the Reformed confessions and theological traditions. Shepherd even somewhat resembled Murray in his mode of speech. He was self-consciously Van Tillian in his apologetic and philosophical orientation. So Shepherd was Westminster through and through. Of the faculty in the early 1970s, he would have been, in my judgment, the least likely to be the center of theological controversy.

            In 1974, however, concern arose on the campus about Shepherd's view of justification by faith alone. He said that in one sense works are "necessary to" justifying faith, citing James 2:14-26 and other texts. He insisted that good works are necessary to justification only as "evidence." But the word "necessary" created a theological storm that polarized the Westminster community until Shepherd was dismissed from the faculty in 1982. The controversy is not relevant to the subject of the present article, so I will leave it here, except to mention that Van Til, though retired during this period, considered Shepherd to be orthodox and provided him with vocal support in faculty discussions. For what it may be worth, I too believed that Shepherd's position was within the bounds of Reformed orthodoxy, though I thought his use of the term necessary was somewhat misleading.

            Robert B. Strimple, whom we honor in this volume, joined the systematics department in 1969, one year after I did. He had been teaching in Baptist circles for several years. But when President Edmund Clowney of Westminster heard that Strimple had come to a Presbyterian view of baptism, he jumped at the opportunity to invite him to join the faculty, even though a three-man systematics department[61] was something of a luxury for us in those days. Strimple was a wonderfully erudite and eloquent teacher of Reformed theology, who had also displayed excellent administrative gifts. Those administrative gifts would be put to good use at Westminster, as Strimple became Academic Dean at the Philadelphia campus and later President of Westminster in California.

Strimple was quite committed to Van Til's approach in apologetics. Alongside his standard courses in systematics, he taught courses in Roman Catholic thought, developing critiques both along exegetical lines and along the lines of Van Til's apologetics. One of his most popular electives was an apologetics course, "The Christian Confronts Modern Atheism," which explored such atheist writers as Nietzsche and Camus. Strimple and I enjoyed an excellent professional and friendly relationship at Westminster in California, supporting one another's work without reservation. When he was president there, the faculty enjoyed deep doctrinal unity and collegiality.

Westminster in Philadelphia faced the need to completely rebuild its systematics department in the early 1980s. The relatively young department of Shepherd, Strimple, and Frame suddenly vanished, with Shepherd leaving the faculty and Strimple and Frame moving to California. Sinclair Ferguson joined the faculty then and was greatly respected for his precise exegesis and his profound applications of Scripture to the Christian life. Others, such as Vern Poythress and church historian D. Clair Davis also taught systematics courses there. Somewhat later, New Testament scholar Richard B. Gaffin, moved to become the mainstay of the systematics department. In the late 1990s, he was joined by Timothy Trumper. Despite all these changes, the close unity between systematics and apologetics held firm and remains so today.

Gaffin and Trumper have emphasized the importance of integrating systematic theology with biblical theology, what Geerhardus Vos called "redemptive history." Redemptive history sees the Bible as a narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and consummation. Van Til was also a great admirer of Vos, as Vos's friend and student. Doubless he would look with favor on the redemptive-historical emphasis, and he would see that as a further integration between systematics and his own vision, which also represents further integration between systematics and biblical studies.

Recent Westminster Apologists

The additions to the apologetics departments after 1980 continue the Van Tillian tradition and hence Westminster's traditional integration of apologetics and systematics. David W. Clowney, son of Westminster's first president Edmund Clowney, replaced me when I went to California in 1980. David Clowney taught the courses I had taught in both systematics and apologetics, making ample use of Van Til's work and of my multi-perspectival approach. He left Westminster in 1988, when he came to the conviction that ordination to ministry should be open to women, a position rejected by Westminster's faculty and board. He joined the philosophy faculty of Rowan University in New Jersey, and still teaches there as of this writing.

William Edgar taught for some years at the Faculté Libre de Théologie Reformée in Aix-en-Provence, France, before joining Westminster's apologetics department in 1989. Before he studied with Van Til, Edgar was influenced by Francis Schaeffer, a former student of Van Til with whom Van Til had some disagreements. In an article, "Two Christian Warriors,"[62] Edgar compares Van Til and Schaeffer, agreeing with Van Til's substantive points, but lamenting the lack of good communication between the two men. Edgar's apologetic, then, is fully Van Tillian, but he has focused on issues that were more characteristic of Schaeffer: music, art, general culture. In his short books Reasons of the Heart[63] and The Face of Truth[64] he has put Westminster's apologetic within the reach of thoughtful laypeople.

With Knudsen's retirement, Scott Oliphint joined the faculty. Edgar reports that Oliphint "is really THE Van Til expert here, and while well trained in philosophy, understands the theological thrust of CVT..."[65] Oliphint wrote his doctoral dissertation and several articles on the work of Alvin Plantinga. Thus as before Westminster apologetics continues to engage contemporary movements in philosophy.

In 2000, Michael S. Horton replaced me in the apologetics department of Westminster in California. Horton's background is in historical theology. As I said earlier, God has formed Westminster's apologetic using many different kinds of human gifts: philosophy, systematic theology, missions and evangelism, biblical studies, linguistics, the arts and culture. We can see that this apologetic can be viewed from many "perspectives." It will be interesting to see what Van Tillian apologetics looks like through the lens of historical theology.

I should mention also Peter Jones, who taught New Testament at Westminster in California. A colleague of William Edgar at the Faculté Libre de Théologie Reformée in France, Jones joined the faculty of Westminster in California in 1989. Jones studied intensively the literature of ancient Gnosticism and discovered significant parallels between Gnosticism and modern thought, particularly the "New Age" movement of the eighties and nineties and the "new spiritualities" of our own time. Jones has therefore become as much of an apologist as a biblical scholar, as he has developed an extensive ministry of confronting neo-Gnostic thinking in present day philosophy, theology, politics and culture. To this task he brings a strong Van Tillian sense of antithesis and the resources of Reformed systematic theology.[66]

Conclusion

We have seen that there has been a deep unity and interdependence between Westminster's apologetics and her systematics. I believe that this degree of unity has never been achieved before. The pioneering work of Van Til and Murray has been faithfully honored in their successors. This work has led to a remarkably consistent and cogent presentation of the Gospel to the seminary's students and to the world. On the whole, there has been no war between philosophers and theologians on the Westminster campuses. Biblical studies too has been well-integrated into this general framework, while serving as its exegetical foundation. This integration is worthy of export to other Reformed institutions, as it has been successfully exported to RTS. This bodes well also for the advancement of unity among the Reformed churches.